The recent assassination of Charlie Kirk at Utah Valley University sent shockwaves through the higher education community. U.S. colleges, universities, K12 schools and major hospitals have hosted countless speakers over the past 300 years, including current and past presidents, foreign dignitaries, diplomats, famous scholars, scientists and doctors, CEOs of major corporations, authors, comedians, military leaders and many others.
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Although violence has occurred at past events around the nation, the public and graphic nature of the Kirk shooting has rattled many who have to make decisions about various speakers and the security events will require. While Kirk was a controversial figure, it is important to remember that there is some level of risk for any well-known presenter or visiting dignitary. As with those who carry out many mass casualty attacks, killers who murder high-profile individuals often do so for a variety of reasons including a desire to become famous.
The topic for the very first article I wrote for Campus Safety more than 25 years ago was focused on how to form a protective services unit. This was because, early in my career as a university police officer, I found myself being assigned to provide protection for highly visible and sometimes very controversial figures who came to my university to speak.
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I have to admit that while I was always extremely vigilant, I did not put enough thought into my role until I learned that a state attorney general I was assigned to protect had a $100,000 contract on her by a major drug cartel. I only learned this when she mentioned why two of us were on either side of the room as she spoke at the Mercer University Law School. I realized that I should have learned this through communications with her office before her arrival. This led me to begin researching information on what I refer to as dignitary protection.
Implementing Protective Details in Educational Settings
When I became a school district police chief in 1989, I quickly realized that while our district did not bring in as many big-name speakers as the university, we did still periodically host a number of high-profile individuals, ranging from Captain Kangaroo to presidential candidate Al Gore to Louis Farrakhan.
I decided that we needed to carefully select officers to serve as members of our primary protection detail. We then began having these officers attend training on this unique role at the Georgia Police Academy, and the sergeant who headed up the detail attended an advanced training program offered by the U.S. Secret Service.
While these personnel were clearly not trained to the level of the Secret Service, they were able to provide a much higher level of protection, including a series of strategies specifically focused on the possibility of an attack by one or more snipers.
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Our team not only found ways to provide coverage for all tall buildings, but also for wooded areas within line-of-sight of the arrival and departure paths for the individuals we protected.
As history is replete with examples of high-profile individuals being wounded or killed in spite of even intensive security, I in no way mean to imply that this approach would have been adequate to guarantee that anyone we protected could not be harmed. At the same time, I do feel that this is a logical approach to reduce risk for our institutions of higher learning and other campus organizations that frequently host high-profile speakers. I am sure that some campus organizations do an excellent job in this and are even far more advanced than we were in the 1980s and 1990s.
Assessing Current Campus Threat Levels
It is important to note that our institutions of higher education have not experienced a pattern of assassination attempts for invited speakers and dignitaries. At the same time, having investigated 29 premeditated K-12 school shootings over the years leads me to believe that the Kirk tragedy has significantly increased the likelihood of future attacks. This is particularly true because this assassination has received extensive and at times truly alarming media and social media coverage and commentary.
The vocal support for Kirk’s killer’s actions indicates an even higher risk level for future acts of campus violence. This increased risk applies not only to assassinations but to other forms of violence as well.
Understanding Attacker Motivations
Multiple peer-review research papers have documented the contagion effect related to mass casualty campus shootings. This research aligns with my experience working over two dozen mass casualty school shootings where diary entries, video recordings, social media posts etc. demonstrated the killer’s fascination with and desire to emulate those who have carried out previous attacks.
Campus safety leaders must understand that attackers are often motivated by things that would be difficult for most people to understand. As one of many examples of high-profile individuals who have been assassinated due to the sometimes-bizarre beliefs of their killers, John Lennon was shot and killed by a 25-year-old former security guard from Hawaii who planned his attack for months. In addition to Lennon, the killer had also considered killing singer David Bowie.
In Lennon’s case, the killer had been a serious fan of the Beatles, was allegedly upset by statements by Lennon that the Beatles were “more popular than Jesus” and decided to kill him because in his mind, Lennon was a hypocrite. In this case, the killer not only flew from Hawaii to New York to kill Lennon but actually posed for a photo with Lennon after the singer went out of his way to sign an autograph and pose for the picture with the attacker earlier that day. The killer reportedly told law enforcement officials that Lennon had been very kind to him, even delaying his departure in a limousine to sign the autograph.
Developing Campus-Specific Protective Strategies
These types of tragedies and the widely varied motivations of those who carry out premeditated acts of violence make it even more challenging for campus officials as they make decisions related to the protection of high-profile visitors. The larger the institution, the greater array of guest speakers and dignitaries that require protection they have in a given year.
The size, budget and sophistication of the campus law enforcement or security organization will have a major impact on how much they can do to provide a solid protective detail for visiting speakers. In some cases, the organization may not have a large enough security or police force to form an in-house protective team.
Collaboration with nearby law enforcement agencies for resources and personnel becomes critical for these organizations, as even the U.S. Secret Service routinely requests additional officers from local law enforcement. Smaller organizations may wish to consider contracting with properly trained and carefully vetted protective services contractors for their events.
Essential Equipment and Officer Training Requirements
This recent tragedy has increased the concerns of campus leaders, which has created the need for campus safety executives to request the resources they need to provide a reasonable level of protection for guest speakers and dignitaries. This includes an emphasis on protecting all well-known figures rather than just those who may be controversial. The creation of a protective team and training for those who will provide support — such as crowd control, incident command etc. — can help to address the deep concerns being expressed by campus leaders since the Kirk murder.
A few examples of enhancements for a protective team that often have a significant fiscal impact include but are not limited to:
- Specialized training in protective services
- Training and equipment for support personnel in addressing problems with large crowds, protests etc.
- Robust drone capability.
- Metal detection and security X-ray equipment.
- Video analytics to detect various suspicious behaviors such as fence climbing, loitering detection rooftop activity, license plate recognition etc.
- For larger campus law enforcement agencies, it may be appropriate to provide training and equipment for counter sniper roles.
- Portable clear ballistic shields to create challenges for a sniper.
- Portable visual barriers for outdoor areas to block line of sight. These types of barriers can also create a significant chance that the path of ballistic projectiles will be disrupted.
- Specialized communications equipment.
These examples should be seen as a starting point for potential approaches rather than a “must have” or conversely, a complete list of options.
There are also a number of enhancements that may be obtained through cooperative agreements with area law enforcement agencies. Examples include but are not limited to:
- Scent plume detection canines can detect individuals with a firearm or explosive device in a large crowd. These canines and traditional bomb dogs can also be used for pre-event sweeps of the venue.
- Counter sniper personnel and equipment.
- Assistance from protective intelligence personnel assigned to a fusion center.
Moving Forward After Recent Events
There are a wide variety of factors that should be considered by the campus organization, and there are many specific approaches that are beyond the scope of this article. This information is designed to provide a starting point for the development of approaches that are tailored to fit local risks, resources and realities.
Campus leaders may wish to consult with U.S. Secret Service personnel, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, their state police academy, consultants with a U.S. Secret Service background or highly qualified vendors that specialize in providing training in the specialized field of protective services for expert guidance.
The author of 28 books in his field, Michael Dorn has 46 years of experience in campus safety at the K-12 and higher education environments, and his work has taken him to eleven countries. The author welcomes reader questions and feedback at www.safehavensinternational.org.
