With the new academic year underway, we must take an all-hazards approach to planning for a wide range of emergencies. Some campuses will conduct a threat assessment to determine the most likely and most catastrophic incidents. Others would use historical knowledge, or even perhaps the county’s Hazardous Mitigation Plan. Although active shooter incidents have gone down according to the FBI’s latest Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2024 report, we will always feel the need to spend quality time preparing for such an event.
Campuses tend to focus on recent catastrophic events that receive national attention, even if the chances of such tragedies happening on a particular campus are quite low. Plus, these same recent catastrophic events may even put other more likely threats on the back burner, until that is, they happen again.
For example, after the January 1vehicle ramming attack on Bourbon Street in New Orleans, everyone began thinking about and planning for such an attack. Federal, state, local, and private organizations (especially those who host special events) began to plan for the next vehicle attack, but then there was a lull in such attacks, so the urgency soon became less of a priority.
Understanding Vehicle Ramming as a Campus Threat
Vehicle ramming as a weapon is not new. It is defined exactly as the name implies: car-ramming attacks, or vehicular assaults, in which drivers deliberately plow their vehicles into public gatherings, pedestrians, or bicyclists (Jenkins & Butterworth, 2019).
Vehicle ramming is often seen as a modern threat, but its history dates back decades, with the first documented attack occurring in 1964 in Taiwan when a man intentionally used his bus to injure pedestrians. Although the 1964 tragedy was an isolated case, it can be seen as the start of the evolution of the weaponization of vehicles.
The tactic of using a vehicle as a weapon gained much prominence and attention during the early 2000s in the Middle East, especially amidst the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian militants used vehicles frequently to attack soldiers and civilians during the “Second Intifada”, exploiting the tactic’s low cost and ease of use/execution (Nowacki, Krysiuk, & Szafranek, 2017).
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In Europe, vehicle ramming attacks largely surged during the 2010s. The 2016 attack in Nice, France, and the 2017 incident on the London Bridge were tragic demonstrations of how these attacks can cause mass casualties.
Jeyaretnam (2025) acknowledges that comprehensive data is limited, but according to a 2019 study from San Jose State University researchers , 70% of vehicle-ramming incidents up to that point had happened in the last five years, and in 2016, vehicle-ramming attacks were the most lethal form of attack, accounting for more than half of all terrorism-related deaths that year.
Past Campus Vehicle Ramming Attacks
Perhaps, at least for now, there other, are far more likely threats for campus environments. But should campuses be concerned about vehicle ramming? Yes. As examples:
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (2021): A vehicle intentionally hit pedestrians on a campus sidewalk, critically injuring two individuals. After the incident, many called for better ways to manage vehicle access in busy pedestrian areas with heavy foot traffic.
- Ohio State University (2016): An SUV was driven into a crowd of students before the attacker got out of the vehicle and began stabbing and injuring 11 people. This incident exposed campus vulnerabilities.
- University of California, Santa Barbara (2014): A domestic dispute escalated to a vehicle ramming near campus, which had underlined the need for access control and emergency preparedness.
Threat Assessment and Planning Framework
Preparing for vehicle ramming on campus is like any other possible emergency. Although there are very specific response needs in a vehicle ramming attack (example, blunt force trauma medical needs), such planning will also pay dividends for a more likely vehicle accident, like the one in Savannah, Georgia, in 2004, where a man accidentally accelerated through a marching band and a crowd of spectators in an annual St. Patrick’s Day Parade.
Preparing for a vehicle ramming event is not unlike other events. Beginning with a site- or event-specific threat assessment should provide campus police and event planners with probable courses of action, gaps, and resource needs. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) offers a Vehicle Ramming Self-Assessment Tool that should help planners (https://www.cisa.gov/vehicle-ramming-self-assessment-tool).
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Common sense tells us that there needs to be a crowd of people before a vehicle ramming attack becomes a credible concern, although we must remember it doesn’t always take a special event (parade, sporting event, etc.) to generate a gathering of students – simply students going to/from classes on a busy campus will likely fill the sidewalks with pedestrians.
Campus police and others must know what to look for before the attack. Many intelligence bulletins provide specific indicators and physical security recommendations that are labeled as Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) or For Official Use Only (FOUO) and cannot be published in an open-source manner.
The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, released its May 8, 2025, Security Advisory Note, “Vehicle Ramming Predictive Analysis: Indicators and Future Risk Factors.” This document is available and a must-read for Federal, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Private Security agencies/officials.
What else can be done to prevent a vehicle-ramming incident on campus? First, put yourself “behind the wheel” of the attacker. Where would the attacker target, how would he get there, where are the gaps in security, and why is he attacking this particular site? Planners must use a common-sense approach to fill the security gaps. As much as possible, with life safety and security being the priority, planners should attempt to avoid disrupting the campus environment or the experience of event attendees.
Prevention Strategies and Physical Security Measures
In recent years, the use of active, passive, deployable, or vehicle-ramming mitigation tools has become common practice, as well as vehicle inspections and security checks at entry points, remote parking, and shuttle services (Rodde and Olmstead, 2024). Common sense prevention efforts include:
- Establishing a secure/sterile zone if possible
- Enhancing police presence
- K9 presence
- Strategic barriers/bollards
- Monitoring video surveillance
- Drone aerial coverage
- Outer perimeter surveillance
- Crowd control measures limiting pedestrians on avenues of approach
- Reducing, or when possible, eliminating vehicle traffic within the area of operation
Responding to a vehicle ramming by campus police is like many other emergencies that must prioritize life safety. The immediate actions must be to stop the threat (stop the killing) and to provide medical assistance to those who have been injured (stop the dying). Vehicle ramming attacks, by nature, are mobile and dynamic.
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To stop the killing, campus police and other local first responders must first contain the threat. This may only be accomplished by using police vehicles to immobilize the suspect vehicle. Law enforcement officers may have to ram the attacker’s vehicle to stop it. This is very dangerous for the officers, but under the priorities-of-life model, the order of significance; citizens, responders, and lastly suspects. Officers are expected to expose themselves to this risk.
Vehicle ramming attacks are a deadly force encounter, and therefore, officers may use firearms to stop the threat. However, many departments have policies against firing from or at moving vehicles. These policies are designed to prevent officers from putting themselves in the path of moving vehicles. Stopping a moving vehicle or driver with gunfire is often ineffective and can lead to unacceptable collateral damage. The chances of hitting bystanders or other officers are high in these situations. These policies should be reviewed with vehicle ramming attacks in mind.
Just because the vehicle has been immobilized does not mean that the threat has been contained. The attackers may continue the attack with firearms, edged weapons, or explosive devices. Officers should continue to engage the suspect until the threat is neutralized, similarly to an active shooter response. Once the suspect is in custody and unable to continue the assault, officers must be ready to address potential threats from the vehicle, fire, hazardous materials (fuel) and explosives.
Medical Response Coordination Can Be Complex
The next step for the officers, once the scene is safe, is to get emergency medical services (EMS) to the scene to address injured citizens and the suspect. The facilitation of the medical response is critical. Officers should provide any level of care that is within the scope of their training and authority. In fact, responding to a vehicle attack from an emergency medical perspective will likely be more complicated before EMS arrives, simply because such injuries from a vehicle attack will typically exceed campus police training and on-hand resources.
Walker, d’Arville, Lacey, Lancman, Maloney & Hendel (2022) highlight this point:
- Unique injury patterns are observed in mass casualty incidents involving vehicles.
- Patterns of injury after intentional vehicular assaults may initially appear to be deceptively benign.
It is also the job of these officers to make sure the communication of and coordination with medical personnel occurs. Officers should report the number of injured, access routes, and any possible hazards to the EMS approach. A unified response across the public safety spectrum is extremely important to save lives.
Of course, incident command should be set up as soon as possible, with campus police taking command, and then a likely joint command center will evolve with EMS and fire personnel. Since it will likely be considered a terrorist incident, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will eventually be the lead agency and assume command.
Law enforcement leadership should also consider the follow-up care officers may need who have responded to the incident. Post-critical event stress is an important topic that is sometimes overlooked. The response to the response is an important element of the incident.
Future Considerations and Evolving Threats
So, should a campus be concerned with vehicle-ramming? Of course. Although the likelihood of the threat will probably be lower than typical campus concerns (severe weather, gas leaks, fires, etc.) or events driven by the media, like an active shooter incident, the consequences of a vehicle attack would likely be staggering and must be planned for.
It’s also worth noting that the next vehicle-ramming attack, like all emergencies, will have an added twist. In the New Orleans attack, for example, using an electric vehicle was a different approach that likely added to the number of casualties due to the weight and silence of the vehicle.
Vehicle ramming attacks are not going away and may be considered among the most imminent threats on campuses. Their potential for mass casualties and ease of execution demand proactive planning. The evolving tactics, simplicity of means, and unpredictability of such attacks, especially in high-foot-traffic environments, underscore the need for campus safety leaders to take preventive measures seriously.
Incorporating vehicle ramming scenarios into threat assessments, physical security planning, and emergency response training is no longer optional. As with all hazards, it is not a matter of if, but when, and preparedness is the only effective defense against it.
So, should campuses be concerned? They should be prepared. Additionally, the fact vehicle ramming is an evolving or unknown threat should perhaps be more concerning. What next? Drone attacks?
Other useful sources:
- Ramming Speed: Stopping Deadly Vehicle Attacks, https://tsi-mag.com/podcast/ramming-speed-stopping-deadly-vehicle-attacks/
- Vehicle-Borne Attacks: Tactics and Mitigation, https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/jcat/firstresponderstoolbox/NCTC-FBI-DHS_Vehicle-Borne_Attacks-_Tactics_and_Mitigation-survey.pdf
- Vehicle Incident Prevention and Mitigation Security Guide, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/Vehicle_Incident_Prevention_and_Mitigation_Security_Guide_508_20240418.pdf https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-03/CISA_
- Vehicle_Ramming_Action_Guide_20250319_508.pdf Vehicle Ramming Action Guide, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-03/CISA_Vehicle_Ramming_Action_Guide_20250319_508.pdf
- Vehicle Ramming Incidents and Perimeter Protection, https://drulibrary.uoregon.edu/sites/default/files/rpds/entry/file_for_download/Vehicle_Ramming_Incidents_and_Perimeter_Protection.pdf
- Vehicle Ramming Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Soft Places, https://www.msm.edu/Administration/PublicSafety/Documents/Vehicle-Ramming-SA.pdf
Andy Altizer is a part-time criminal justice instructor at Georgia State University and is also the emergency preparedness coordinator for the Westminster School. Tim Murphy is captain and special operations commander at Kennesaw State University. Nelson De Santos Vazquez is a safety preparedness and security management intern at the Westminster School and Georgia State University.
Note: The views expressed by guest bloggers and contributors are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, Campus Safety.
