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Can Mass Notification Really Change the Outcome of Emergencies?

Two college administrators question the effectiveness of emergency notification systems.

By Oren Alter and Ernest Burt III | December 12, 2011 | Comments (1) | Post a comment

Mass notification capabilities in higher education facilities have evolved significantly over the years. From fire alarms and internal PA systems, current mass notification systems have morphed into intricate systems that communicate emergency messages via Voice mail, E-mail, text messaging, instant messaging and social media updates.

A driving force behind the metamorphosis of mass notification has been the availability of new technologies and networking strategies. The 2007 tragedy at Virginia Tech has been a major catalyst in the implementation of mass notification capabilities.  The Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 (HEOA) section 668.46 (g.1) formally categorized the requirement for an IHE mass notification capability and defined the initiation procedures of these systems. The culmination of technology and regulation inevitably raises the question of whether or not the outcome still serves the original objectives of mass notification.      

Mass notification is first and foremost a capability intended to improve safety and security.  A closer examination of current mass notification practices would appear to indicate the following:

  • The 2008 Clery act amendment requires initiation of process after confirmation of an emergency. The assumption of an absolute ability to confirm an emergency ignores statistics that indicate that 20% of targeted violence "took place off campus or in non-campus IHE locations against targeted IHE members" The alternative of addressing random personal or local law enforcement as a confirming entity is both potentially time consuming and highly inaccurate in the initial phase of an emergency, thus putting into question the core of the practice.
  • Mass notification Clery act regulation emphasizes speed of delivery. However, from a pragmatic perspective, an unavoidable delay exists between the generation and transmission of mass notification and between the fluid and rapidly evolving nature of critical events. When speed is prioritized over accurate and factual information, or when the generated messages fail to portray rapidly changing circumstances, they can create confusion and critically contradict responses (evacuation vs. lockdown). A result of an erroneous response by the campus community can, in turn, significantly hinder first responder's efforts. 
  • Early, and possibly inaccurate mass notification context can, and has been, directly broadcasted over local media outlets, a practice that adds to the confusion and anxiety level of all involved.
  • Historically, most extreme incidents end within 10-15 minutes, commonly before law enforcement arrives on scene. Since in such cases mass notification is received by its intended audience only after the incident is over, an unavoidable question is what effect can mass notification possibly have on the final outcome of extreme events when information is unavailable when it is most critically needed? 
  • The threat of terrorism and prolonged 2008 Mumbai style attacks might be a shift in the active shooter 10-15 minute time frame assumption; however "Mass Notification" in a mega attack scenario would no longer apply to the limited campus community but rather to a far grander scale.

As of mid-2010, institutions that receive federal funding are required to implement a mass notification capability. Evolving technologies and the rapidly developing social media medium enable new and unprecedented mass notification strategies. The aforementioned arguments indicate that the 2008 federal mass notification amendments were arguably a hasty  reaction to the Virginia Tech incident and fail to take into full account realistic limitations while emphasizing  reactive measures to critical events.

In an economy and industry of limited resources, decision makers need to better understand the core limitations of mass notification and clearly define mass notification goals, in realistic terms, prior to selecting and implementing a mass notification system. Funds allocated to mass notification can potentially yield a greater return on investment if spent on alternative, proactive or preventive measures. Only a comprehensive and balanced approach that includes mass notification in its proportional roll can restore a lost equilibrium to the traditional concepts of crisis management and emergency response. 

Ernest Burt III, M.C.J. is the associate dean of criminal justice at Keiser University, and Oren Alter is the associate vice chancellor of crisis management at Keiser University.

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Note: The views expressed by guest bloggers and contributors are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, Campus Safety magazine.

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We’ve heard a number of differing reports about the effectiveness of the emergency mass notification tools at Virginia Tech. The university said they were fully and immediately deployed during the Dec. 8 shooting incident, which left a campus police officer dead. The university said those who subscribed to the system and had access to their devices – cell phones, smart phones, tablets and computers – received tweets, emails and voice-mail messages. Others on campus also heard sirens. Some reports from outside the university said that only a small percentage of subscribers did, in fact, get the message, but the only way to know for sure is if school officials release the records. Still other reports said that most students on campus didn’t pay any attention to the sirens and had no idea an incident was occurring. What wasn’t mentioned is whether anyone heard an intelligible-voice loudspeaker system to tell everyone not connected to the current warning system that something was happening. Those not connected at the time of the warning had no way of knowing a shooting had occurred and that the shooter was at large. And if there were visitors on campus, they would have especially needed clear instructions about where to go and what to because they may not have been familiar with the campus. Fortunately, this shooting was not as widespread an incident as the 2007 shooting at Virginia Tech, in which 33 people died. But many public-safety concerns still remain. Without a network of loudspeakers designed and engineered specifically for broadcasting highly intelligible voice messages indoors and outdoors, a significant population will not be reached the next time something happens. They won’t get instructions that could save their lives, whether it’s another shooting or a weather-related emergency. That holds true for any college campus – anywhere in the world. Sirens – as evidenced by reported student remarks – don’t always get attention. People pay more attention
Stefan Pollack
December 13, 2011
Author Bios
David  Burns
David Burns

With more than 30 years in public safety, David served as a 9-1-1 dispatcher and paramedic operations manager in Oakland, Calif., for 10 years, working six days at the Cypress "880" freeway collapse during the Loma Prieta earthquake in October 1989. David brings over 20 years executive/administration experience serving nine years in EMS administration as a regional disaster planner; seven years as a full-time emergency manager for a municipal fire depart

James  L. Grayson
James L. Grayson

Jim Grayson is a senior security consultant. His career spans more than 35 years in law enforcement and security consulting. He worked for UCLA on a workplace violence study involving hospitals, schools and small retail environments and consulted with NIOSH on a retail violence prevention study.

Michael  Dorn
Michael Dorn

Michael Dorn serves as the Executive Director of Safe Havens International, a global non profit campus safety center. During his 30 year campus safety career, Michael has served as a university police officer, corporal, sergeant and lieutenant. The author of 25 books on school safety, his work has taken him to Central America, Mexico, Canada, Europe, Asia, South Africa and the Middle East.

Robin Hattersley Gray
Robin Hattersley Gray

Robin has been covering the security and campus public safety industries since 1998 and is a specialist in emerging technologies and systems integration. She joined CS in 2005 and has authored award-winning editorials on important campus safety issues, including gang prevention, grants and funding, network integration, IP video, emergency notification, emergency management and communications, crime trends and risk management.